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Passage of the federal wage and hour bill did not represent a sharp break with
laissez faire in this field. Rather did that law mark a logical step in a movement
that, both here and abroad, has been progressing for many years. As a matter of fact
the Federal Government has been making attempts to raise the standards for various
groups of workers since 1840. From an economic point of view, federal legislation
of this sort differs from state regulation principally in extent of coverage. Any history of wage and hour legislation must, therefore, include the interesting story of
state laws.
Before tracing the development of state and federal interferences with the "natural
laws" of economics, however, a distinction should be drawn between such interferences on the basis of motivating principles. Such dassification is necessary not so
much for describing historical development as to clear the air for future discussions
lest advocates be striving for one type of law and the opponents be arguing against
an entirely different sort. Motives, to be sure, are exceedingly difficult to fathom and
undoubtedly reasons given to legislative bodies and courts are not always the actual
ones. Furthermore, different interests may sponsor the same bill for unrelated, and,
perhaps, inharmonious, reasons.
Classified on the basis of motives, hour legislation may be divided into five groups.
In the first place, protection of health has been the underlying reason for a considerable part of American legislation. Certainly the legal reduction of weekly hours
from 6o to 50 can be classed in no other way. Somewhere in the demand for a downward trend of hours the notion that unemployment can be cured by having every
one work fewer hours has stimulated government action. A 3o-hour a week proposal may be thus classified. Between the 3o-hour and the 5o-hour a week proposals
lies the point above which health considerations are paramount and below which
curing unemployment is the more important purpose. The third type of hour law
envisages an indirect increase in wages. It is not supposed that required work can
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always be accomplished in the shorter time period; the established hours are the
basic hours and extra pay is expected for overtime. In actual practice, depending on
the industry, the same law may bring about better health, shared work, or increased
pay. A fourth type of regulation, recently introduced in European countries, increases
the usual hours of work, for the benefit of a state defense program. Such legislation
has not as yet found a counterpart in this country. These four groups of hour laws
affect private industry. Organized labor has likewise sought and gained special concessions from governments for work on government projects. Improved standards
under such circumstances are easier to obtain by law than by collective bargaining.
There is a desire here to take advantage of a relatively strong, strategic position,
coupled with the desire that governmental projects shall set examples of good standards and not depress labor conditions in any degree.
Five distinct motives can likewise be found for wage regulations. The historic
reason for such legislation has been to improve the lot of the lowest-paid fringe of
female workers, unable because of lack of bargaining strength to help themselves.
This motive is still an important one, but a different principle underlies fixing wages
by law considerably above the average wages of the industry. Such legislation is
based upon the so-called purchasing power theory of the business cycle. Between
these first two types it is not always easy to distinguish. Whereas a 2o-cent minimum
is certainly directed to the mitigation of the sweating evil, opinion might differ as to
the reason for a 5o-cent minimum. Another type of wage-fixing has been motivated
by the belief that modern economic society must be planned rather than be allowed
to run its supposedly unplanned course. Wage-fixing under such a scheme becomes
merely one aspect of general price-fixing. A fourth type of law has been designed to
eliminate industrial warfare by establishing boards to arbitrate disputes, incidentally
to fix wages. Finally, as with hour legislation, labor and its friends have sought for
reasons indicated there to obtain good wages in government sponsored work by
legislation rather than struggle for those wages by means of collective bargaining.
Laws of the three latter types go further than merely fixing a minimum wage. They
provide for the establishment of the entire range of rates including the differentials
as well as the minima.
This paper will deal with the-various types of laws but no attempt will be made
to classify each legislative enactment that is mentioned.
HOURS

The present fair standards law provides both hour and wage regulation. Historically, however, these two phases of the employment contract have been acted
upon separately.
Hour legislation has been the generally accepted state practice for many years. In
1898 the Supreme Court approved a Utah law, regulating the hours of labor for men
working in mines. In that same decision was laid the foundation for future hour laws
when Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the Court, said in part:: "But the fact that
'Holden v. Hardy, x69 U. S. 366, 397 (1898).
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both parties are of full age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive
the State of the power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality
or where the public health demands that one party to a contract shall be protected
against himself." This judgment had the apparent effect of overruling an earlier
2
state court decision with respect to an Illinois maximum hours law for women.
Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court,3 with the exception of the refusal to
uphold a New York io-hour law for male bakery workers, 4 paved the way for
nation-wide acceptance of maximum hour laws for women and in some instances
for men. By January i, 1939, 44 states had limited to some degree the hours of labor

for women, and five states likewise included men in the general laws. About a dozen
states, furthermore, limit hours for men in specific industries.
Though hour regulation has been chiefly reserved to the states, the Federal Government has not ignored that half of the labor contract. Until recently, however, federal
activities have been limited to public works and to the transportation industry. In
the former, the Government merely acts as an employer in establishing working conditions. In the latter, the way for such laws is made easier by the more ready solution
of constitutional problems and the fact that the safety of the traveling public is
involved.
Though acting in the role of employer, the Government in fixing hours has had
considerable influence upon other industries. Since 1840 when President Van Buren
by executive order stipulated the io-hour day in Government navy yards, 5 the Federal
Government has led industry in hour reduction. As early as i868, when the 8-hour
day was little more than a fantastic dream, Congress decreed those hours for any
workers employed on Government contracts.6 That law, though not entirely effective,
was continued and by 1936 further Congressional action had provided regulation to
cover most possible cases. The Walsh-Healey Act, to be discussed later, was passed
in that year.
Excessive hours having been recognized as a factor in railroad accidents, both
state and federal legislation was passed to change the situation. In 19o7, by a law
applicable to workers on interstate railroads, Congress set i6 as the maximum number of hours to be worked in one day and provided for adequate rest periods.7 In
1916, at the insistence of President Wilson who sought to avert a strike, Congress
provided for a basic 8-hour day for railroad trainmen with no reduction in wages. 8
This latter feature seemed to prove to those opposing the act that it was in reality
a method of increasing wages rather than reducing hours.
By the time of the New Deal, regulation of hours by government was a principle
2 Ritchie v. People, 155 Il. 98, 40 N. E. 454 (1895).

' Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (19o8); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 (1915); Bunting v. Oregon,
'Lochner v. New York, i98 U. S. 45 (1905).
243 U. S. 246 (1917).
'8 COMMONS, DocumENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTIAL SOCIETY (igio) 85, as referred to
in Co MMONS AN AwDEEws, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEOisLATrIoN (4 th ed. 1936) 117.
a 16 STAT. 77 (1868); see COMMONS AN AND)ws, op. cit. supra note 5, at Iz8.
'34 STAT. 1415 (19o7), 45 U. S. C. 161 (1935).
s39 STAT. 721 (i916), 45 U. S. C. S65 (1935).
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accepted in general by legislatures and courts alike. Most states had accepted iohour laws for women and were considering regulations providing for shorter times
for both men and women.9 The federal government had likewise regulated in those
fields open to it. Other state and federal laws can best be considered in a discussion
of wage legislation.
WAGES

State supervision of wages has had an entirely different legislative history than
that of hour legislation. Advocates of nineteenth century economic liberalism were
apparently able to convince state legislatures or, in any event, the courts that any
tampering with the wage side of the employment contract would surely lead to widespread unemployment among those for whose benefit the law was passed. Yet
throughout the world a study of actual conditions proved that however horrible a
situation might be brought about by interference with economic laws, the workers
could hardly be any the worse off.
The first tempting of the divine hand of competition came in Australia. Despite
the newness of the country and the comparative scarcity of the labor factor, the economic position of a large number of the working population shocked the legislature
of the country into action. In 1896, after a series of studies had been made of the
situation, a minimum wage law went into effect in Victoria.
The skies did not fall in Victoria and England likewise decided to tempt fate.
A vigorous campaign, however, preceded legislative action. The London Daily
News, a leading newspaper, arranged an exhibit to illustrate the evils of sweating.
In a large hall typical rooms were set up, and typical workers made lace, chains, and
many other commodities for the wages conspicuously posted by each booth. Such a
display accomplished more than pages of statistics. In i909 Parliament provided for
the establishment of wage boards for industries with exceptionally low wage scales.
Selected for the first application of the law were paper box making, chain making,
lace making by machinery and wholesale ready-made tailoring.
Since the passage of the first regulations, the history of wage legislation in
Australia and in England has been the story of improvement. 10 Gradually in Australia hours and wages have become matters for direct or indirect state action not
only to better conditions in the sweated industries but also to settle trade disputes
between employers and employees by means of compulsory arbitration. In Great
Britain, over 50 boards now determine minimum wages for the industries concerned
'However, on March 14 of this year, in passing judgment on a statute making 56 hours the maximum
in the manufacturing and mercantile establishments of South Carolina, the supreme court of that state
said in part, "the Court must conclude that the Act violates the due process, equal protection and contract clauses of both State and Federal Constitutions, in that it is not a proper exercise of the police
power of the State." Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, 2 S. E. (2d) 36.
Pennsylvania's maximum hour law applying to men as well as to women was held unconstitutional

by the state supreme court on the grounds of improper delegation of legislative power. Holgate Bros.
Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 2o A. 672 (1938).
"oSee ARMSTRONG, INSURING THE ESSENTIALS (1932) and MILLIS AND MONTGOMERY, LABOR'S PROGRESS
AND SOME BASIC LABOR PROBLEMS (1938) for detailed discussion of the Australian and English minimum
wage movements.
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and, imperfect though the present situation is, the intense suffering of pre-interference days has been ameliorated.
State regulation of wages in the United States may be divided into three periods.
First came the period of investigation of conditions and experimentation with laws
which culminated in 1923 at the time the Supreme Court in deciding the case of
Adkins v. Children's Hospital" invalidated the District of Columbia legislation.
This decision was followed by another type of legislation designed to meet judicial
objections but it, too, was finally declared illegal in 1936 by the Tipaldo decision declaring the New York law unconstitutional."2 Finally, the way for further legislation was opened when the Court in 1937 upheld the Washington law in West Coast
Hotel Company v. Parrish.13
Massachusetts passed the first minimum wage law in 1912. This action culminated more than a decade of activity on the part of the National Consumers'
League. That organization, tracing its ancestry to the Consumers' League of the
City of New York, had worked for many years in an attempt to obtain voluntary
cooperation for a $6 a week minimum wage. Competitive conditions were such that
these efforts came practically to naught with the result that after i9o9 the League
devoted itself to legislative efforts rather than to voluntary white lists.
The Massachusetts law provided for a wage commission with authority to establish wage boards as needed. These industry boards, after studying all the factors
involved, were charged with determining the minimum rate for the particular industry. The rate thus arrived at, however, was not mandatory. Failure to comply
with a board ruling merely involved the employer in publicity when the board published its rulings together with the statement of noncompliance.
Other legislatures followed the Bay State's lead and 14 additional states, Puerto
Rico and the District of Columbia had enacted some type of law by I923.14 Much
of this legislation was far from satisfactory. Massachusetts and Nebraska laws were
not mandatory and, as the Commissioner in Massachusetts said in 1916, the sweat
shops against whom the legislation was directed were operated by the type of employer who would pay no attention to an advisory minimum. Four of the laws
(Utah, Arizona, South Dakota, and Puerto Rico) established a legislative minimum
instead of leaving the actual rate for determination by a board. Such a plan is hopeless in a state with diversified interests and during a period of rapid price changes.
Two of the laws (Colorado and Nebraska) never went into effect. The record for
the decade had certainly not been spectacular. All of the legislation except Massachusetts' non-mandatory law was in states predominantly agricultural. Yet a start
had been made and the people had had a chance to see that sweat-shop wages could
be raised without entirely upsetting the entire economy.
11261 U. S. 525 (1923).
11

Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587.
U. S. 379.

11300

x' Wisconsin, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, California, Utah, Colorado, and Nebraska all enacted
laws in 1913; Kansas and Arkansas added the legislation in 1915; Arizona passed a law in 1917, and
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, North Dakota, and Texas in x919, and South Dakota in 1923.
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Probably one reason for the slow progress of wage laws was the position of organized labor. Samuel Gompers sought to make the American Federation of Labor
an economic rather than a political group. "We want a minimum wage established,"
he wrote in 1913, "but we want it established by the solidarity of the working men
themselves through the economic forces of their trade unions rather than by any
legal enactment."'- Labor, however, has always favored regulations which "affect
or govern the employment of women and minors, health and morals, and employment by federal, state, or municipal government.'" This plan of legislating for the
17
economically weak is apparently still the official policy of the Federation.
Industrial unions, however, are probably more interested in raising standards by
legislation than the craft affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. The 1938
United Mine Workers Convention, for example, resolved that the national officers
should submit proposed legislation to Congress, "establishing as the law of the land
a six-hour day and a thirty-hour week for all industries in interstate commerce without any decrease in the established wages and a guaranteed minimum wage.' 8
All of the early laws, i.e., those passed before 1923, provided that the minimum
wage established by a board should be adequate to supply women with necessary
costs of living and to maintain them in health and welfare. The District of Columbia
law, and some others, likewise provided that the wage should be high enough to
protect morals. That state maintenance of such a standard constituted the proper
use of the police power had been challenged, of course. In the case of Stettler v.
O'Hara (1914), 19 the state supreme court had upheld the Oregon law. By April,
1917, the Supreme Court, by a four to four decision, had sustained the verdict of the
state court.2 0 Mr. Justice Brandeis, only recently appointed to the Court, took no
part in the case since he had helped prepare the brief for the state.
Such was the apparently settled constitutional status of state wage laws for women
when in 1923 the Supreme Court rendered its decision concerning the minimum
wage law of the District of Columbia. 21 Both Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion for
the majority and the rigorous dissents of Mr. Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Taft,
have become classics to be quoted in part by all advocates of advanced social legislation.
This is not the place, however, to discuss this decision and these dissents in detail.22 Justice Sutherland failed to see a reasonable connection between public health,
safety, and morals and the regulation of wages. Presumably the justice believed that
individual wages are without exception determined by the value of the service rendered. If these women contracted with their employers to receive low wages, the
inconvertible conclusion was that they were receiving all they were worth. Govern-

is 49 INT.

MOLDERS J., April, i913; cf. Shishkin, Wage-Hour Law Administration from Labor's View.

point7 (1939) 29 Am. LAB. LEGIS. REv. 63, 64.
1651 INT. MOLERS J., Feb., 1915.
" See AFL PRocEEDiNGs (1933) 279, (1934) 357, (935)
451.
(938)
9
49 UNITED MINE WoR.ERS J., No. 4, P. Mi.
1q69 Ore. 519, 193 Pac. 743.
20 243 U. S. 629 (1917).
"Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra note 11.
1

See Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 545.
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ment regulation by interfering with freedom of contract and exacting "from the employer an arbitrary payment" was taking property without due process of law and
therefore against the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Persons interested in advancing social legislation thought they had discovered
a possible way out in a dictum of Justice Sutherland, which seemed to imply that
whereas increasing wages to protect a woman's health and morals was not a subject
for legislative action, a legislature could raise a low wage to a point high enough
to cover the value of the service. 23 In drafting new laws, therefore, it was provided
that in addition to considering need, wage boards should establish rates "commensurate with value of service or class of service rendered." In 1924 Wisconsin took
the lead in the attempt to meet the Court's objections, but it required the conditions
accompanying the depression starting in x929 to help carry additional laws through
the legislatures. This second wave of legislation brought seven new laws in 1933
and in 1934 a mandatory feature to the old non-mandatory Massachusetts law. All
of these laws contained the "value of service" clause designed to overcome the Supreme Court's objections. It is noteworthy, moreover, that whereas all the early laws
were passed in agricultural states, the 1933 group included New York, New Jersey,
Ohio, Connecticut, and Illinois as well as New Hampshire and Utah.
When in 1936 the Supreme Court by a five to four decision invalidated the New
York State law, students of social legislation were gready surprised that legal opinion
on this subject had remained stationary for thirteen years. 24 The Court refused to
distinguish between the "living wage" law invalidated in the Adkins case and the
"living wage plus value of service" law of New York State and others. The Court
refused to distinguish, but the following year when asked by the State of Washington
to change its mind, the same court personnel did so, saying in West Coast Hotel
25
that "the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital should be, and it is
Co. v. Parrish
overruled." Mr. Justice Sutherland, who had written the earlier decision, and three
of his colleagues dissented.
Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Oklahoma have passed wage laws since the Parrish
decision. This brings the total of state laws to 25 and the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico likewise have legislated. Only Oklahoma has brought men within the
law;201 the other states abiding by tried legislative and constitutional standards have
included only women and minors.
Always a powerful argument against state social legislation has been that of interstate competition. Since the days of the earliest factory legislation to the present,
" Mr. Justice Sutherland after condemning the District of Columbia law for exacting an arbitrary
payment "with no causal connection with . . . the contract or the work the employee engages to do,"
continued with these words: "The moral requirement implicit in every contract of employment, viz.,
that the amount to be paid and the service to be rendered shall bear to each other some relation of
just equivalence, is completely ignored." 261 U. S. 525, 558.
2'Supra note 13.
"Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, supra note 12.
"The supreme court of the state has recently declared the Oklahoma law unconstitutional in so far as
it affects men and minors by reason of insufficiency of title. On other grounds the court said the law
met constitutional tests. Associated Industries of Okla. v. Industrial Welfare Commission, go P. (2d) 899
(1939).
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each new proposal for reform has been greeted with the cries that it would drive
industry from the state or nation. Real or imagined, this factor has had to be met.
Usually the way around has been by means of federal legislation such as the present
social insurance laws. Another method tried in fixing wages and hours has been
interstate pacts.
This movement for cooperative action in the field of wages and hours was instigated by Governor Roosevelt of New York at a meeting of the governors in Albany in i93i. Later conferences culminated in May, 1934, when representatives from
seven states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) signed the first interstate compact. The pact aimed to
secure uniformity of standards for conditions of employment, particularly with reference to wages and hours of women. The New York law incorporating the aforementioned "value-of-service" principle was taken as the standard. According to the
terms of the compact, it was to become operative as soon as two states had ratified
it and the consent of Congress had been obtained. By 1938 three states had ratified:
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Congress had given the necessary
approval 2 7
The quicker method of obtaining uniform results among states whose industries
compete is by means of federal legislation. In this field the spectre of states rights
has always been a restraining influence. Nevertheless the present wage and hour bill
does not mark the first move of the federal government into this type of legislation.
At least until the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, however, federal legislation had
been based on different principles than those embodied in state laws. State laws have
attempted to mitigate the sweating evil among women and minors admittedly economically weak; federal legislation has involved either an attempt to aid weak bargainers or to legislate for the "purchasing power" theory of business cycles, or the
spending theory of recovery. Occasionally these two motives have likewise involved
the clearing up of a sweated industry.
Reference has previously been made to the Adamson law passed in 1916 to avert
a railroad strike. The Brotherhoods were prepared to enforce their demands by striking and the railroads were apparently prepared to stand pat. The law, 28 called an
8-hour law, provided for a basic 8-hour day but likewise provided that no reduction
could be made in wages until an investigating committee established by the act had
reported. In this way the federal government apparently strengthened the bargaining
power of the union. The Adamson Act was certainly not designed to improve conditions in a sweated industry.
The principles involved in wage rate determination under NRA codes are not
readily determined. Presumably the codes were aimed at establishing a wage floor
above the level to which wages had fallen during the depression. In many instances
this was true but in others the obvious reason was not so much to cure the evils of a
2750 STAT. 633 0937)-

"Supra, note 8.
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sweated industry made worse by depression but to fix a wage at the point the workers
felt was a reasonable return for their services.
All of the 585 "codes of fair competition" contained definite minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions. The wage minima ranged from i2V/ cents an hour for
the Puerto Rico needle trades to 70 cents in the construction industry codes. In codes
covering 55 per cent of all the codified employees the rate was 40 cents or over; about
five per cent of the codified workers were guaranteed minima less than 30 cents 2 9
Apparently if the Supreme Court had not acted unfavorably on the N.I.R.A.,8 0
this attempt at federal regulation of wages would have resulted in two things. In
many industries sweatshop conditions would have been ameliorated; in others actual
wage-fixing on a scale not heretofore attempted would have resulted.
General minimum wage legislation having been returned to the states by the
action of the Supreme Court, the Federal Government attempted to fix certain standards in those circumstances undoubtedly in its field of control. None of these wage
clauses, with the possible exception of those contained in the Sugar Act of 1937, are
designed to raise the standards of sweated workers. They belong more with that type
of legislation designed to insure to workers upon public projects the prevailing wage
in the community or industry.
The United States Housing Act of 1937,81 for example, includes a section that all
contracts "shall contain a provision requiring that the wages or fees prevailing in the
locality, as determined, or adopted ... by the Authority, shall be paid to all . . .
laborers and mechanics employed in the development or administration of the lowrent housing or slum-clearance project involved." Similarly the Davis-Bacon Act
with respect to public works contains a proviso that all contracts must contain a wage
s2
clause for wages at rates which the Secretary of Labor has found to be prevailing
Of more wide-spread application is the Walsh-Healey Act3 3 of 1936 applying to
all large federal contracts for the purchase of commodities. In addition to the 8-hour
day and 4 o-hour week, the law provides that the Secretary of Labor shall fix minimum
wages at the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar work in the
locality. Thus far the Secretary has fixed minima ranging from 32/2 cents an hour
for the manufacture of men's underwear in certain parts of the South to 67 cents
an hour in the men's hat industry 3 4 Because the administrator is limited to fixing
the prevailing wages, theoretically the Act should have little effect upon wage rates.
Actually future studies may show that administrative discretion has served to boost
the wage rates at least on the sweated fringe of the multitude of industries from
whom the Federal Government purchases.
20
20

(i935) 43 Mo. LAD. REv. 886.
Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).

50 STAT. 896, 42 U. S. C. §1416(2) (Supp. 1938).
246 STAT. 1494 (1931), 40 U. S. C. §276a (i935) as amended by 49 STAT. io1
§276a (Supp. 1938).
"49 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §35 (Supp. 1938).
0(1937) 45 Mo. LAB. Rav. 694.

(935),

40 U. S. C.
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Three other New Deal laws contain provisions giving the Federal Government
control of certain wage rates. Most likely to affect an unorganized, poorly paid group
of workers is the Sugar Act of I937.35 Designed to aid sugar producers, the act none
the less contains a clause forbidding benefit payments unless the producer "shall
have paid wages therefore at rates not less than those that may be determined by the
Secretary to be fair and reasonable after investigation and due notice and opportunity
for a public hearing...."
Likewise giving a federal agency the power to fix wages are the labor clauses of
the amended Merchant Marine Act of 1936,36 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of
I938.3 The former provides that the United States Maritime Commission shall determine working rules for all types of vessels receiving an operating differential
subsidy. The latter enacts into law a 1934 decision of the old National Labor Board
which set a gradually increasing base rate of $i6oo as annual wages and hourly rates
at $4 an hour and up for all air line pilots.
From the early Utah law regulating hours of labor in the mines of the state, and
the Massachusetts non-mandatory wage law, to the present labor standard laws of a
state like New York has marked a real change in legislative feeling toward state
interference in the labor contract. The federal interference in the field from the early
days of President Van Buren's first decree to the days of the NRA and thence to the
present wage-hour law has likewise seemed spectacular. Only a study of the intervening years indicates how gradually public opinion in general has shifted from
laissez faire to collective action, and how organized labor, in the days of Gompers so
opposed to state interference, has come to accept wage-fixing schemes such as the
NRA as part of the economic scene.
as50 STAT. 903, 7 U. S. C. §1133 (Supp. 1938).
a652 STAT. 954 (1938), 46 U. S. C. §x31 (Supp. 1938).

8752 STAT. 987 (x938), 49 U. S. C. §481(1) (Supp. 1938).

